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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses some potential security risks, concerning terrorism or 
more mundane forms of crime, such as fraud, in management of nuclear 
waste using a PEST scan (of political, economic, social and technical issues)
and some insights of criminologists on crime prevention. Nuclear waste arises 
as spent fuel from ongoing energy generation or other nuclear operations, 
operational contamination or emissions, and decommissioning of obsolescent 
facilities. In international and EU political contexts, nuclear waste 
management is a sensitive issue, regulated specifically as part of the nuclear 
industry as well as in terms of hazardous waste policies. The industry 
involves state, commercial and mixed public-private bodies. The social and 
cultural dimensions – risk, uncertainty, and future generations – resonate 
more deeply here than in any other aspect of waste management. The paper 
argues that certain tendencies in regulation of the industry, claimed to be 
justified on security grounds, are decreasing transparency and veracity of 
reporting, opening up invisible spaces for management frauds, and in doing 
allowing a culture of impunity in which more serious criminal or terrorist risks 
could arise. What is needed is analysis of this ‘exceptional’ industry in terms 
of the normal cannons of risk assessment – a task that this paper begins.
KEYWORDS: Criminal opportunity; European Union and international policies; 
Nuclear waste; Security; Terrorist risks; Risk; Vulnerability of economic sectors; 
Waste management
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines security risks around the civil ‘nuclear fuel cycle’ and its relation 
to waste management; the increasingly important subject of decommissioning of 
power stations at the end of their lives; and issues around storage, recycling and 
disposal of the high, medium and low level wastes that result. This is done by means 
of a PEST analysis (Byars, 1991), scanning the political, economic, socio-cultural 
and technical contexts of nuclear waste management, and interpreting potential risks 
primarily from the perspective of what is known or can be surmised about such risks 
in the broader context of hazardous waste managements.
All such scanning exercises are potentially rather fluid and malleable, so questions
properly arise about the perspectives brought to bear, core assumptions, selective 
(dis-)attention to issues and so. The analysis as performed here is by a small team of 
criminologists, who specialise in research on the evolution of crime risks in global
society and aspects thereof (see for example Vander Beken 2005), and who have 
researched such risks in relation to waste management (Dorn et al. 2007, Van Daele 
et al. 2007). The most specific proposition that the authors bring to this and other 
work is that diversity in intelligence and risk analysis constitutes a public safeguard 
(Dorn, 2009, see also Dorn and Levi 2006). More generally, the authors draw upon 
criminology for the proposition that, since criminality is formed in interaction with 
controls on it, the specific controls may push risk away from it may be expected and 
into other channels: in other words criminality and regulation are mutually-
constitutive. The authors look for possibilities that crimes and irregularities may arise 
from lack of or insufficient level of regulation (enabling casual crime within the 
industry), inappropriate regulation or, in some cases, over-regulation (causing 
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‘displacement’ of criminal efforts to less protected areas). In relation the nuclear 
waste industry, they offer hypotheses below about such possibilities.
There is a sense in which the above proposition may be pushing on an already 
opening door. Clearly, in recent years a series of unexpected events in the fields of 
terrorism, weather events and financial markets put into question experts’ and 
regulators’ approaches to risk assessment. Put at its simplest, the questioning has 
two dimensions, which may be summarised as ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’. Regarding 
subjective aspects, the public may frame its concerns in ways not always totally 
amenable to the forms of evidence that regulators and industry experts collect, 
estimate or construct (an analogy here is genetically modified food crops, where 
European public opinion seems reluctant to accept what European scientists have to 
say about risks). Regarding objective aspects, it is clear from historical and 
contemporary examples drawn from many fields – most recently the credit crunch of 
2007 onwards – that highly-expert regulators and private sector risk-modellers
sometimes exhibit ‘herd behaviour’ and may fail to anticipate ‘Black Swan’ events. 
Such dangers are greatest when the dialogue and model-building are highly complex 
and are comprehended only by a highly-expert group. 
A quick introductory example: public concerns about nuclear waste in Europa are 
mainly on the longer-terms issue of storage and its possible effects on the 
enforcement (European Commission 2008, reporting Eurobarometer survey). Even if, 
as the European Commission claims, such public opinion is largely based upon 
‘misconceptions that become strong beliefs among citizens’ (ibid, 92), nevertheless it 
exists. Thus it appears that, as far as safety is concerned, the strategic focus of the 
anti-nuclear movement, pointing to the very long term dangers for ‘future generations’ 
and the environment (no2nuclearpower, no date) either quite well reflects or shapes 
the agenda for European public concern. Furthermore, the specialist focus upon (and 
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protective actions taken in relation to) transportation may be shielding us from 
realisation of less well shielded risks (see below). Prudent regulators and policy 
makers take note of such meta-risks (risks about risk assessment: see inter alia
Brown and Michel 2003, Scales 2007). Outsiders can support that process and it is in 
these terms that we justify this discussion.  
2. POLITICAL CONTEXT AND PLAYERS
2.1. International policy
International treaties cover nuclear waste management in two main ways. First, 
concerning hazardous wastes in general, through the Basel Convention (United 
Nations, 1989), covering not only radioactive materials but also explosives, 
compressed gases, flammable solids, and corrosives,.Second, concerning nuclear 
power, the fuel cycle and related waste issues specifically, the Non Proliferation 
Treaty (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1970) and other international 
agreements are relevant and, within the EU context, both the Euratom Treaty and the 
EC Treaty may be applicable, depending on the precise issues. 
In relation to management of hazardous wastes generally; the Basel Convention 
states that illegal traffic occurs if the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes 
is taking place under the following conditions: without notification pursuant to the 
provisions of the Convention to all States concerned; without the consent of a State 
concerned; through consent obtained by falsification, mispresentation or fraud; when 
movement does not conform in a material way with the documents; or when 
movement results in deliberate disposal of hazardous wastes in contravention of the 
Convention and of general principles of international law. Common methods of illegal 
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traffic include making false declarations or manifests, the concealment, mixture or 
double layering of the materials in a shipment and the mislabelling of individual 
containers. […] (Secretariat of the Basel Convention, no date, a). Because 
hazardous wastes pose such a potential threat to human health and the environment, 
one of the guiding principles of the Basel Convention is that, in order to minimize the 
threat, hazardous wastes should be dealt with as close to where they are produced 
as possible (Secretariat of the Basel Convention, no date, b). 
In relation to civil nuclear power and non-proliferation of technologies and materials 
that might be used for weapons purposes, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a well known and topical landmark. Its objectives are to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving general and 
complete disarmament. The Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the 
responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), which also plays a 
central role under the NPT in areas of technology transfer for peaceful purposes. The 
IAEA’s mission is underpinned by three main pillars: safety and security, science and 
technology and safeguards and verification. On safety and security issues the IAEA 
helps countries to upgrade nuclear safety and security, and to prepare for and 
respond to emergencies. Work is keyed to international conventions, standards and 
expert guidance. In the safety area, the IAEA covers nuclear installations, radioactive 
sources, radioactive materials in transport, and radioactive waste. A core element is 
setting and promoting the application of international safety standards for the 
management and regulation of activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials.
In the security area, they cover nuclear and radioactive materials, as well as nuclear 
installations. The focus is on helping states prevent, detect, and respond to terrorist 
or other malicious acts - such as illegal possession, use, transfer, and trafficking -
and to protect nuclear installations and transport against sabotage. The Nuclear 
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Safety Review of the IAEA presents an interesting overview of worldwide trends and 
issues in nuclear, radiation, transport and radioactive waste safety and emergency 
preparedness, highlighting developments (IAEA, 2006).
2.2. Regional/EC policy
As for the European Community’s general waste strategy, the aim is seen as 
reconciling a continuation of economic growth and prosperity, whilst at the same time 
actually reducing the impact upon the environment of wastes of all kinds. In this 
vision, whilst economic growth increases, resource-use would increase only 
marginally and, due to more efficient use of resources, the environmental impacts 
thereof would actually decline. This would be the intention in relation to waste in 
general and in relation to hazardous waste. European Commission initiatives in the 
field of decommissioning nuclear installations are based on chapter 3 (article 37 et al) 
of the Euratom Treaty and on a number of Resolutions and Directives of the Council 
(EU 1985, 1992, 1994, 1996)
2.3. National policies
From a theoretical point of view, there could be common benefits from concentration 
in just a few countries of the highly expensive, potentially hazardous and technically 
very demanding aspects of nuclear power for electricity generation and other civil 
applications – which could service other countries in all aspects of the fuel cycle, 
including waste (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004, 6). On the other hand, 
many countries would prefer not to have their energy security – and nuclear 
technology – in the hands of another country, especially one that might in any way 
and at any time in the future be ambivalent, non-cooperative or hostile.
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3. ECONOMIC CONTEXT AND PLAYERS
3.1. Nuclear waste management as exceptional business
Although nuclear waste looms large in policy terms, such wastes are not very large in 
volume terms, when compared with other forms of waste, hazardous and non-
hazardous.1 Much of the world’s nuclear waste arises from the generation of 
electricity where, by volume, fossil fuels of course generate the greatest amount of 
waste (European Environment Agency, 2001). Enhancing the nuclear energy 
development is sometimes seen as one of the main solutions in this area (Qiang, 
2002). Yet, other alternatives such as hydropower and wind power may come close 
in this perspective.
Nuclear wastes are of course volumetrically tiny compared with fossil fuels. In 
business terms, however, nuclear wastes are ‘big’ and are becoming more so. This is 
due to three main factors. (i) All aspects of management are highly expensive, one 
driver of costs being the length of time over which secure storage would be 
necessary, another being the measures necessary to contain any long-term 
migration of radioactivity into the immediately surrounding environments or more 
widely – issues that are sharply contested, with anti-nuclear power groups 
suggesting that it would be impossible to guarantee that migration could not happen
(no2nuclearpower, no date). The costs arise because radioactive wastes from 
ongoing electricity generations and other uses of nuclear materials are highly 
dangerous over many hundreds or even thousands of years, the appropriate means 
                                               
1 As a reference point, the average French citizen generates about 10 tonnes of all kinds of 
waste per year, of which radioactive wastes account for about one kilogram. This is 1% of 
toxic waste, which itself is 1% of all wastes. 90% of this kilogram is short live radioactive 
waste and is disposed of on an industrial basis; the 10% remaining are long life waste.
(European Commission, 1999) 
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of disposal being a matter of controversy (as mentioned above). Reprocessing only 
marginally reduces radioactivity, even though it may recover some re-usable 
elements. Even ‘temporary’ storage (which may last many decades) is not without 
difficulties, dangers, needs for monitoring and security and attendant financial costs.
Commentators differ on whether short-term storage is welcomed by the industry on 
the grounds of at least having somewhere to put waste (maybe not in the producing 
country) or worries the industry on the grounds that disposal matters are not ‘settled’ 
and controversy remains.i The waste outputs from existing and operational nuclear 
facilities are financially significant, on both a European and global basis. Additional 
wastes are being generated as nuclear facilities come to the end of their 
economic/safe lives, and have to be decommissioned, entire facilities then becoming 
waste.
One of the most interesting areas of debate over the management of nuclear waste 
in relation to crime and terrorist risks is the issue of transport of the waste. All forms 
of waste, from the most highly radioactive reactor contents to the low level waste, 
have to be transported from their places of origin to their places of rest (temporary of 
other). Transportation might be seen to be more open to terrorist attack (to create 
local contamination) or criminal misappropriation (for purposes of sale on the illicit 
market or possibly as an object for blackmail), in comparison with static locations that 
are seen as being more secure. Our concern is not whether this assessment is 
correct but in what follows from it: some precautions. Not only are arrangements 
made for physical security during transportation, also the national intelligence 
services carry out surveillance of and infiltration into any proto-terrorist or anti-nuclear 
groups that might, potentially, be tempted to embarrass the industry and government 
by causing, for example, a derailment of a railway wagon carrying flasks. Assuming 
competence on behalf of the agencies responsible (at least most of the time), it 
seems reasonable to assume that such precautionary measures reduce the risks that 
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might otherwise attend transportation. By contrast, static guarding and access control 
is a relatively routine matter, and common experience suggests that, in such 
circumstances, boredom, selective attention, slackness and 'making things look right'
may creep in. The result may be that, whilst security in transportation stages of 
nuclear waste management may be held to a high standard, security in static storage 
may decrease to the extent that simple thefts can arise (example given below). This 
is an example of the interaction of the ‘exceptional’ characters of security around 
nuclear waste management and the ‘mundane’ characters of everyday operations in 
the industry, making it unwise to take conventional wisdoms for granted. We need to 
look at the specifics of such situations against the background of what is known 
generally of crime and insecurity.
3.2. Owners, investors, costs of entry, profitability/solvency
The nuclear waste management business has a foot in several industrial sectors: 
energy generation, in particular nuclear generation of electricity; science and health 
(diagnostic and treatment); the food industry (irradiation); infrastructure (construction, 
oil/gas exploration); and the military (transport, for example submarines, and of 
course nuclear armaments, waste from the latter not being dealt with in this report).
The industry is a relatively restricted club, both in terms of the countries involved and 
in terms of numbers of main contractors - although because of the complexity of 
processes involved, there are a much larger numbers of subcontractors (discussed 
later). One reason for this being a restricted club is that the cost of entry are high, 
and getting higher (Turkenburg, 2004).
All European countries with a civil nuclear industry are members of the Euratom, the 
European Atomic Energy Community (as previously discussed). This was 
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established in 1958 to "create conditions necessary for the establishment and growth 
of nuclear industries." According to United States Congressional briefing, the US 
“promoted its establishment to benefit sales of U.S. nuclear power reactors and 
related equipment, fuels and technology in Europe.” (Carl et al., 1996)
As for reprocessing, within the EU the main players are France and the UK. About 
20,000 people in the UK are said to be employed in production, reprocessing and
waste handling in the UK. The UK processes spent nuclear fuel from countries 
including Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Italy, Netherlands and 
Canada. For 2005, the UK Atomic Energy Agency reported a turnover of £378.2m, of 
which a considerable amount (£291.8m) used to represent grant in aid income 
received from the DTI. The balance included funding from EURATOM and EPSRC 
for JET and UK fusion projects, charges for the services of UKAEA Constabulary on 
non-UKAEA sites and income received from property tenants. (UK Atomic Energy 
Agency, 2006/2007).
Spent fuels either may be held on site for many years, close to the reactor, or may 
after an initial cooling period be (partially) reprocessed to separate different grades 
and types of waste. Reprocessing is expensive and is partial in effectiveness
(Schaper et al., 2001). The question may arise as to why, if reprocessing is 
expensive, increases the volume of the waste, and does not make a fundamental 
difference to the radioactivity of overall waste, then why is it done at all? The answer 
is both economic and political. In terms of the economics, reprocessing is a profitable 
business for enterprises selling this service. Politically, since there are relatively few 
reprocessing centres in the world, sending waste for repossessing may shift it out of 
the country of origin, which may help with public opinion there. In part, the customer 
is paying for relocation of the waste. Even though there may be some return 
shipments after processing, typically not all the volume or radioactivity that is shipped 
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to another country for reprocessing is returned to the country of origin. A critical 
perspective on this was presented by Greenpeace stating that reprocessing is a very 
uneconomic technology: “Countries send nuclear spent fuel for reprocessing to delay 
having to deal with the nuclear waste themselves - in effect they are dumping their 
nuclear waste problem onto France, UK and Russia. Most of the nuclear wastes 
arising from reprocessing will stay in France, UK and Russia forever.” (Greenpeace 
UK, 2001).
Irrespective of the location of nuclear facilities and or reprocessing and disposal 
sites, the economics of waste are impressive. 
Decommissioning and cleanup of the global civil nuclear legacy represents a 
massive management, technological and environmental challenge for the UK and 
international community over the next century. The Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority (NDA) is responsible for a work programme lasting for decades worth 
billions of pounds and the development of a long-term, diverse, robust and 
competitive supply chain. The scale of investment required by the UK alone is £50 
billion, opening up opportunities for both existing companies and committed new 
entrants. This is dwarfed by the global market, estimated to be worth £300 billion 
over the next 30 years, providing major opportunities for the UK. For example, over 
400 civil nuclear reactors in operation worldwide will need to be decommissioned 
over the next several decades (Greenpeace UK, 2001).
In summary, there is a global market for nuclear decommissioning (Bambrough and 
Buckley, 2005). 
3.3. Industrial processes and their management
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Models of the inputs and outputs of a nuclear waste management organisation are 
characterised by a high level of complexity (Mortenses and Pinci, 1997). For present 
purposes, important questions arise around transport, financing of waste processing 
and disposal, the keeping of administrative records and management thereof.
3.3.1. Transport
Nuclear waste is seldom stored or reprocessed at the location where it was 
produced. This imposes special security risks related to the transport of such 
materials. While the starting and end point of the nuclear waste are fixed sites that 
can be secured in various ways, transport happens in a much more flexible 
environment. About 20 million transports of radioactive material (which may be either 
a single package or a number of packages sent from one location to another at the 
same time) take place around the world each year (World Nuclear Association, 
2008). Though many efforts have been put into the safety and security of such 
transport it stays a significant point of attention. The costs of transport of nuclear 
waste are considerable and the sector under pressure:
The depressed market for uranium production, the restructuring in the nuclear 
industry worldwide, and reduced economic margins following electricity market 
deregulation and liberalisation have placed additional strong pressures on the 
nuclear transport industry. It must become more cost-efficient, flexible and even more 
responsive to the needs of utilities and others (Bjurström, 2000: 2).
3.3.2. Who pays?
Who pays for nuclear waste storage/disposal/recycling? Although the details vary 
across different countries, there are four main ‘end-payers’: future generations, which 
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will have at least some financial costs in monitoring, maintaining and/or remedying 
problems; today’s general taxpayer, who picks up some of the bill (partly through 
cost-sharing and special funding at a European level); electricity consumers, 
domestic and/or industrial, who in some countries face a levy based on electricity 
consumption; and, in some countries, those producing or consuming nuclear electric 
power specifically. How costs should be allocated is not something to which just one 
answer has been given (UK Nirex and others, 1999, 162).
If we deem costs to be allocated fairly when the charges for individual waste streams, 
and hence the charges to individual waste producers, exactly match the proportional 
contributions which those waste streams have made to overall costs, then a levy on 
all electricity generation is the least likely mechanism to deliver this objective. […,] 
Fairness is not just a matter, furthermore, of fairness between waste producers. 
Another important aspect is that of intergenerational equity. [...] The issue here is 
whether, since the present generation cannot canvass the views of future 
generations, the present generation has the right to take a decision to adopt such 
policies, thereby acting, in effect, as proxy for future generations. (UK Nirex and 
others, 1999, 162)
Considering all the ways in which EU member states are applying funds to disposal 
of ongoing wastes and to decommissioning, it could be impossible to reconcile all 
aspects with the competition provisions of the EC Treaty. The European Commission 
applies competition provisions to the nuclear sector as to other types of energy 
generation (Areva case ECJ), however there is some commentary on whether or not 
current nuclear ownership structures and financial support, and the use of State Aid, 
may be easily reconciled with competition policy. As far as policy is concerned on the 
management and financing of decommissioning, the EU partially deflects competition 
issues by using the Euratom Treaty. (UK Nirex and others, 1999, 162)
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For all the good intentions on competition and proper use of funds (Nuclear 
Engineering International, 2004), the situation leaves open issues about 
transparency, etc, as previously discussed. There may be potential fraud issues. 
3.3.3. Record-keeping
Safeguards are based on a structure of material balance areas, in which the 
radioactive inventory must be accounted for. This is backed up by various forms of 
surveillance and monitoring and by inspections (Schaper et al., 2001). In some 
countries, record keeping may be complicated by a reluctance to refer to some highly 
radioactive waste products as such. According to the House of Lords the IK inventory 
of radioactive wastes would be much more valuable as a tool for development of an 
integrated strategy if it included all the materials which may be declared to be 
wastes. The situation in which materials such as plutonium, depleted uranium, and 
spent fuel for which there are no definite plans for reprocessing are excluded, can 
lead to gaps and inconsistencies in national planning for waste storage and disposal 
(House of Lords, Select Committee on Science and Technology, 1999, paragraph 
4.5)
3.3.4. Risks arising in relation to processes and management 
One potential risk concerns government employees – as well as other industry-
employed experts – ‘improving’ data, in order to be able to make a coherent and 
public policy case regarding management of nuclear waste. The State of Nevada in 
2008 submitted to the US regulator some legal arguments against the siting of a 
high-level radioactive waste disposal facility at Yucca Mountain. Nevada’s objection
included observations on the lack of concrete standards for protecting Yucca 
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Mountain from terrorist acts and for keeping track of and accounting for sensitive 
nuclear materials that may be shipped to Yucca Mountain. It was argued that these 
standards are critical because vast quantities of highly dangerous radioactive 
materials will be stored above ground at Yucca Mountain, where they will be exposed 
to potential acts by terrorists. Also, it was stated that if some of these same materials 
(high-enriched uranium and plutonium) are stolen from the Yucca Mountain site, they 
could be used to manufacture nuclear bombs for use against United States targets
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008, 20). 
The reference to management arrangements for keeping track of material underlines 
points made above. Also, it is clear the arguments are not only scientific – in terms of 
the margin of safety if such a depository is properly managed – they are also 
procedural and political. The procedural complexity arises as a result of the many 
levels of debate and consultation (federal departments and regulators, state level 
legislatures, local communities, scientific advisors, environmental and health activists 
spanning all these levels). The political complexity has been added to by post-2001 
concerns over terrorism: the more that government alerts states, agencies and 
citizens to a terrorist threat, the more difficulty it may experience in persuading them 
of the virtues of large dumps of radioactive material. Similar observations could be 
made regarding European and other countries.
In Pakistan, for example, the overall security situation is unstable with large number 
of terrorist groups operating within the country, with an armed insurrection ongoing in
Balochistan and with the government loss of control of several provinces to Taliban. 
This generally unstable security situation is considered not well conducive to stable 
long-term expansion of nuclear power capacity and both economic and security 
trade-offs are play when considering large scale nuclear capacity expansion in 
Pakistan’s situation. (Braun, 2008, 278).
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In Chechnya, several incidents with terrorism potential that involved nuclear waste 
material and its repositories have been reported. Already during the Chechen military 
campaign between December 1994 and August 1996, about half of some 900 cubic 
meters of radioactive waste, went missing from a repository near Grozny. Many 
suspected that Russian soldiers have stolen the radioactive material and sold it on 
the black market. Others, however, argue that the waste could also have been 
removed by the Chechen militants, who demonstrated their readiness to use such 
material in furthering their goals by burying a radioactive container in Moscow’s 
Izmailovsky Park in 1995. Although the radioactivity level of the found containers was 
not very high, the incident nevertheless caused great concern about the possibility of
more serious radiological terrorist attacks in the future. Special radiation search
teams were set up in Moscow and some other large Russian cities to detect,
secure, and dispose of dangerous radiation sources. (Zaitseva and Hand, 2006: 838)
Other potential risks include circumvention of import/export regulations (Greenpeace 
International, 2005). Such risks are in addition to those implied in the use of private 
contractors, in relation to which there have been historical problems. The US General 
Accounting Office argues that the DOE [the US Department of Energy] almost 
entirely relies on contractors to carry out its production, research, and cleanup 
missions. They call the department’s history of inadequate management and 
oversight and of failure to hold its contractors accountable for results as a high-risk 
area vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. (United States General 
Accounting Office, 2004, 10)
Because fraud risks of a general nature arise – multiple opportunities in relation to 
procurement and sub-contracting, work done incompletely and falsely reported, 
managerial and auditing misrepresentations - the need to audit is well appreciated. It 
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is argued that a thorough risk evaluation to determine the likelihood of material error, 
including fraud, occurring might help to determine the level of audit evidence needed 
to support the audit opinion, concentrate efforts towards high-risk areas and improve 
the cost-effectiveness of audit testing. (International Atomic Energy Agency General 
Conference, 2001, 43)
These methods of steering audits towards areas thought to be higher risk are well 
known across all areas of auditing. At first glance, they appear sensible and there are 
indications that they may make cost effective use of limited resources. However, their 
effectiveness relies upon an assumption that high risks do not arise in ways unknown 
to one – something of a ‘hostage to fortune’. In summary, audits are especially vital 
when accounting for hazardous products and services, they may have additional 
rigour when there is high political sensitivity, however the record suggests that both 
errors and misdemeanours occur in this area as in others. This potentially opens the 
door to fraud and crime.
4. SOCIAL/CULTURAL CONTEXT AND PLAYERS
Societal risks and risk perception are particularly important in nuclear waste disposal 
issues (Voganov and Yim, 2000). Appropriate information provision is therefore 
indispensable.
4.1. Attitudes to risk: energy security versus waste disposal fears
There are at least two universal expectations from innovative reactors. The first 
demand is the guarantee of no significant release of radioactivity in the environment 
under any circumstances. The second expectation concerns almost unanimously the 
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radioactive wastes: less waste, less long-lived wastes, and no waste at all if possible. 
However the most significant expectations are expressed in the following wishes of 
common people: “I expect power when I flip my switch” and "Do not increase my 
electricity bill” (Barré, 2004, 83).
According to Turkenburg (2004, 46-50) nuclear waste management and disposal is 
probably the issue where the gap between nuclear supporters and opponents is 
widest. Debates on the pros and cons of using nuclear energy show that the public 
resistance and (perceived) disadvantages are related mainly to the following issues: 
1. Public acceptance of nuclear fuel cycles; 2. Safety risks of nuclear power plants 
and other components of the nuclear fuel cycle; 3. Lifetime and management of 
nuclear waste, especially High Level Waste; 4. Proliferation of fissile materials and 
nuclear weapons; 5. Accumulation of radionuclides in the biosphere up to 
unacceptable high levels; 6. Scarcity of nuclear resources; 7. Cost of nuclear energy; 
8. Industrial development (local capacities, customers interest, spin offs, 
employment); 9. Lock-in effects (impact on development of non-nuclear options). 
Indeed, mainstream political, industry and expert opinion is in favour of disposal in 
deep geological formations, on the basis that the risks there over many centuries 
would be lower than the risks to indefinite storage on the surface (CoRWM, 2006). 
Since the scientific evidence is not definitive – a major difficulty being how to foresee 
possible seepages or vents and their implications over thousands of years – the 
points of view arrived at have a strong cultural component. For example, sealing a 
problem underground may feel more comfortable than having to tend for it on the 
surface, because although the authorities can more easily manage a surface facility, 
the long-term continuation of the authorities and hence of their care cannot be 
guaranteed, opening up the possibility of malign environmental or human 
interventions. A UK House of Lords committee attempted to weigh up the issues. It 
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stated that surface storage of conditioned, packaged wastes in modern facilities for 
several decades is feasible and safe. Beyond periods of this length it will be 
necessary to refurbish stores extensively and perhaps replace them. Repackaging of 
wastes may also become necessary. To the Committee further surface storage for 
several centuries raises much greater problems, the likelihood of societal breakdown
being the major one. Indeed, world-wide, there are many examples of civilisations 
which have appeared and disappeared within a century. According to the Committee 
even a lesser change in society could have serious consequences if it led to stores 
falling into disrepair, and wastes and packages degrading to such a degree that it 
would be risky to retrieve packages and very difficult to convert wastes to a stable 
form again. Furthermore, the Committee argues that over several centuries there 
could be climatic changes (particularly sea level rises) which would make it 
necessary to move wastes to new stores in other locations. This would entail risks, 
particularly to workers. Another concern of the Committee is that over centuries the 
foundations and reinforcement in stores could weaken, making them more vulnerable 
to earthquake damage. Again this would necessitate building new stores and moving 
wastes to them. (House of Lords, Select Committee on Science and Technology, 
1999, paragraphs 4.32-4.34). 
Deep storage may feel safer in these terms. Also, at least some experts believe that
some deep geological conditions offer disposal options which would be highly stable 
and very low risk (CoRWM op cit). However, public surveys seem to suggest that a 
majority of the general population in some European countries may not trust experts 
and governments on the nuclear issue. As Turkenburg puts it on the basis of general 
population survey results, ‘The size and persistence of the resistance [to nuclear 
power] leads to the question whether it will ever be possible to obtain public 
acceptance of nuclear power again’, partly because the public does not entirely ‘trust 
nuclear experts’ (Turkenburg, 2004, 47). Experts generally work with a concept of 
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risk in which their calculations of very low probabilities should be regarded literally 
(10-8 chance of death for individuals, for example). However, the public, may not ‘buy’ 
that message, because absence of evidence of problems does not mean that there 
will be no problems (Shrader-Frechette, 1993) and because the possibility of severe 
accidents with many victims cannot be excluded in principle after all (Turkenburg, 
2004). Moreover, application of decision analysis models have concluded that the 
policy for storing waste in underground repositories is misguided since the 
assumptions underlying this policy are inappropriate (Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 
1994).
It is further argued that social acceptability has to be put on equal footing to technical 
concerns in such discussions. This implies that a viable program and satisfactory 
solutions can only be created through a long-term process of building public trust and 
deeply engaging potentially affected communities in the planning process (Flynn et 
al. 1992; Easterling & Kunreuther, 1995; Flynn et al., 1995). The substantially 
increased public fear of technological hazards, “stigmatizing” certain places and 
products (like nuclear power plants), makes it hard for expert opinions to be 
influential in the decision making process. (Gregory et al. 1996).
A similar argument may be developed concerning the transport of nuclear waste. 
From a technical point of view, the transport link of the nuclear fuel cycle is a very 
safe and robust link. Experience shows, however, that the perception of transport of 
radioactive materials by the general public, and the response to this by political 
decision-makers, authorities and carriers, may cause concerns and has led to far 
reaching demands (Bjurström, 2000; Binney, et al. 1996; Riddel, 2009).
4.2. Information for public debate: transparency versus security
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A US action group, which works to limit the production and storage of high-level 
radioactive waste and to oppose license renewals for nuclear plants until there is a 
permanent safe and operating solution to the storage of high-level radioactive waste, 
opines that the integrity of “force-on-force” tests that are designed to ensure a power 
plant can defend against a minimum attack scenario, in terms of the number of 
attackers, their tactics, and their training, has been undermined by a conflict of 
interest. The group states that Wackenhut Corp. holds contracts to guard 31 of the 
64 commercial nuclear sites in the U.S. and will be hired to conduct the force-on-
force exercises at all the nuclear plants in the country. In that way, they state, 
“Wackenhut will be testing itself at half the sites.” (Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility, 
no date, 1-2)
More broadly, the same source believes that the public plays a critical role in 
providing oversight of the NRC and its enforcement of security regulations. Though 
the events of September 11 have stimulated a call for stronger standards, such as 
forcing inclusion of a truck bomb attack scenario and the creation of uniform training 
and qualification standards for mock adversaries, the NRC announced in August 
2004, that it would no longer release any information about security at nuclear plants 
for fear that publicly identifying major weaknesses could help terrorists. (Alliance for 
Nuclear Responsibility, do date, 1-2).
Thus, security concerns may undermine security, in the sense that checks and 
balances – previously provided to some extent by outside scrutiny – can be 
discarded by a regulator’s decision to scale back transparency, citing fears of 
terrorism and suggesting that public knowledge of regulatory failures might ‘help 
terrorism’. One could argue that such secrecy provides spaces of impunity in which 
managerial mistakes and technical failures can be covered up, and a culture of 
‘adjusting’ the record can become normalised, decreasing control and increasing a 
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range of risk running from terrorism to fraud. Corporate sensitivities in nuclear waste 
management can give cover to mundane employee frauds. 
The events happened in 2002 in Los Alamos National Laboratories illustrate this. 
Two employees who had successfully been exposing credit card and purchase order 
fraud as well as security problems were fired by the Director of Safeguards and 
Security. It was stated that all signs indicate that leaders at Los Alamos were 
motivated in the firing by a desire to silence these and other individuals who are 
uncovering widespread corruption. Project on Government Oversight, 2002). 
A government inquiry corroborated a number of the concerns expressed by the 
terminated security officials related to weak internal controls and other property 
management issues. (US Department of Energy, 2003, 4). Of course, frauds and 
cover-ups are not unknown in broader contexts. However, the heightened 
sensitivities in this industry may exacerbate the initial risks of frauds and possibly 
also increase some persons’ motivations to take actions against any whistleblowers. . 
The brutal assault on one of the auditors who reported a disturbing pattern of 
financial irregularities in the Los Alamos Lab' procurement division , in apparent 
reference to his upcoming congressional testimony on this fraud, shows that such 
actions are not unlikely to happen (Project on Government Oversight, 2005)
4.3. Risks in the corporate culture of management
Any appraisal of risks must be controversial, partly because of entrenched political, 
economic and value positions to be found in the public arena, and partly because of 
the difficulty of defining ‘low probability’ of crimes and other adverse events. How low 
does ‘low probability’ have to be, to be regarded as zero probability for all practical 
purposes? Is it therefore a so-called hard risk (Blockley and Godrey, 2007)? Or 
should ‘low’ probability be enough? In a spirited exchange of views in the US, a panel 
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of advisers expressed concern about terrorist action against pooled nuclear waste, 
leading to radioactive fires (National Research Council, Committee on the Safety and 
Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, 2006), whilst the regulator 
referred to such scenarios as ‘improbable’ (Skane and Petty, 2005). 
Some might say that, given the potential seriousness of adverse events, only zero 
probability should be acceptable. A counter-argument to that could be that such a 
requirement could lead to falsification of the odds and of the vulnerabilities in the 
human and technical systems (and unexpected interactions between the two) that 
generate those odds.
5. TECHNICAL CONTEXT AND PLAYERS
5.1. Nuclear waste management is technology
In discussions of waste, the distinction is conventionally made between hazardous 
waste and non-hazardous waste – with the proviso that in many cases the two are 
mixed. The aims of waste management are to minimise the amounts of waste 
generated, to minimise the proportion that is hazardous, to minimise the level of 
hazard that remains, if possible to the level where what previously was hazardous 
can be re-classified as non-hazardous. It can then be disposed of by relatively 
inexpensive means (Weissenbach, 2001) such as landfill.
As for the extent and manner of treating hazardous waste in general before disposal, 
this varies – from chemical treatment of the constituents in order to deal with 
separately, to landfill without treatment (sometimes after a delay in time). Nuclear 
waste is a category of hazardous waste. Those who produce it, wish to do with it 
what all producers of hazardous waste wish to do: they want to transform it into less-
or non-hazardous forms, to secure it from accident to interference and/or to transfer it 
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to locations which are regarded as remote in a social sense as well as a 
geographical sense. Where any remaining radioactivity is at a very low level, and 
where sites safely can be returned to public or normal commercial use, then that may 
be done – particularly because of the demonstrative/symbolic value of photographs 
of green-filled sites and happy people. That said, nuclear wastes, and particular high 
level wastes with high longevity, pose particular problems and consequently offer a 
big market for those operators capable of mastering the technologies and economies 
of scale, taking into account that some of longer-term costs of waste management 
may be capped, by government underwriting them (Department for Business, 
Enterprise & Regulatory Reform 2008, 153, para 372) and also taking into account 
an expected fine-tuning of future tax obligations (ibid, 154, para 373).
5.2. Technical options in waste storage/recycling/disposal
The situation in relation to current practices regarding management of reactor fuels 
varies in the EU member states. The most simple option, which also minimising the 
volumes of such waste, is not to reprocess it (at least not for the present) but to keep 
it onsite, in pools or in casks. According to Schaper et al. (2001) the necessary 
technical steps to be followed, if reprocessing is not chosen as waste management 
strategy, are either a) to keep the spent fuel in extended pond storage at the reactor 
or in external storage ponds (preferred option e.g. in Sweden), or b) to package the 
spent fuel into dry storage casks and store these either on-site or off-site in central 
storage facilities. After an extended cooling time of at least 20 years the spent fuel is 
ready to be disposed directly into a final repository in deep geological formations, if 
such a facility is available at that time. Prior to final disposal repackaging of the fuel 
into specially designed casks is foreseen in most of the currently followed waste 
management plans. Compared to the reprocessing route, the necessary technical 
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steps are less complex, lead to smaller waste volumes and a much smaller number 
of different waste forms to be stored and finally disposed. (Schaper et al., 2001)
The situation in relation to reprocessing varies amongst European countries as well.
(Schaper et al., 2001, 48-49). As for the future, the main characteristics of the 
innovative fuel cycle concepts are to introduce additional waste management 
options, such as partitioning and transmutation, in order to reduce the mass and 
radioactivity of wastes going for final disposal. They are trying to close the fuel cycle 
not only for plutonium but also for the minor actinides. Compared with the results of 
the conventional fuel cycle options, on the whole, the innovative fuel cycles have 
much more benefits in terms of natural uranium use and reduction in spent fuel 
amounts waste. (Chang, 2004,102)
Unfortunately, nuclear fuel recycling processes, designed to reduce (a) long-term 
radioactivity of waste and/or (b) potential availability of materials for proliferation, may 
themselves have some adverse environmental effects, such as emission of 
radionuclides into the biosphere (Turkenburg, 2004, 47).
5.3. Risks based on the technical nature of nuclear products/waste
Historically, EU research on nuclear questions and safeguards has dealt mainly with 
technical and safety questions (Schaper et al., 2001, 15). Following 2001, 
proliferation has moved up the research agenda. That is a highly controversial area 
which seems as much driven by power politics as technical risk assessment. This 
point is underlined by the run-up to the invasion of Iraq and by the efforts of the 
United States and some other countries to prevent Iran from mastering the fuel cycle
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– whilst assisting some other countries such as India. These high-level political risks 
are especially difficult to integrate into a more general assessment of security risks.
6. CONCLUSION
Nuclear waste management is regulated as part of the nuclear industry (Non 
Proliferation Treaty, Euratom), as well as in terms of hazardous waste (Basel, EC 
Treaty). The industry involves state, commercial and mixed public-private bodies, 
mostly in electricity generation but also other civil applications. There are major 
international and national nuclear industry players. Waste management processes 
include capturing, grading and separating the various levels of radioactive waste; 
storing it (sometimes for decades); transporting it locally, nationally or internationally; 
processing it; recycling some elements; and/or (semi-) permanently depositing the
remainder, under secure conditions in the case of remaining high level radioactivity. 
The social and cultural dimensions of nuclear waste management – risk, uncertainty, 
future generations – resonate deeply. Waste management attracts public disquiet, 
government support, industry lobbying, scientific debate and, increasingly since 
2001, scrutiny for possible security risks. During the same period, climate change 
has become a mainstream political as well as scientific issue and – to the dismay of 
anti-nuclear campaigners and the delight of the nuclear industry – the global risk of 
climate change is being counter-posed against those of nuclear waste (Beck 2008). 
Running across this is a strongly politicised set of international allegations and 
denials about proliferation, which has a strong waste management aspect insofar as 
certain products of the nuclear cycle can be weaponised. 
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In this fervid atmosphere, some of the more mundane crime and fraud risks run by 
the waste management industry may be overlooked by analysts, commentators, 
regulators and governments. Yet, the authors maintain, it is more likely through this 
relatively lightly guarded ‘back door’ of the industry that the larger security risks may 
be facilitated (see for example the examples above secrecy, reduction of oversight, 
increased opportunities for management mis-reporting, etc). There is merit in peeling
away the claims of exceptionalism made equally by the industry’s advocates and 
detractors, and examining its processes and oversight for risk factors in the same 
way one would do for an ‘ordinary’ industry or sector. One then finds not only the 
‘ordinary’ crime and frauds risks – notably around procurement, management or staff 
misappropriation, bribery and corruption, and improper record-keeping – one finds 
also security meta-risks, which may be increasing. These meta-risks arise from a mix 
of an exceptional security regime and a shielding of management from full 
transparency (this being justified partly on the basis of security). Extraordinary risks, 
yes, and an extraordinary industry and regulatory regime. All the more reason to 
apply to it some basic fundamentals of crime risk assessment, a start towards has 
been attempted in this paper. 
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